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Since 1999, the Supreme Court has explored the linkages between domestic
statutes and international norms and values and has slowly developed the
basic principles underlying a new mechanism of relevancy that the authors call
harmonization of domestic law with international law The authors analyze this
development in Part I of the present article. In Part II, they study the application
of this harmonization mechanism in the field of Canadian immigration law Of,
particular importance in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is s. 3(3)(f),
for it directs judges to construe and apply the IRPA in a manner that "complies
with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory" They
found that instead of harmonizing the interpretation of all relevant IRPA provisions
with international law, courts are harmonizing the application of the legislation as
a whole with international law They conclude that s. 3(3)(f) has been reduced to
a merely symbolic value.
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Introduction
The reception of international law into domestic law is known for its
uncertainties but one can safely say, without being controversial, that the
traditional, dualist model which found its roots in the distinction between
implemented and unimplemented international law is evolving. One of
the great challenges faced by academic scholars today is to find new
ways of theorizing this evolving reality while at the same time remaining
sufficiently pragmatic to be of use to judges in their day-to-day tasks. In
recent years, scholars have suggested many ways of conceptualizing the
new role of international law in domestic law, including an approach based
on the persuasive authority of international law, a second based on the role
of international law as part of the context of adoption of domestic law, a
third focused on the discretionary power of the judge, a fourth based on a
comparative law analogy, a fifth which attributes weight according to the
pedigree of the international instruments, and so on.'
One of the greatest areas of confusion is the question of the reception
of non-implemented international law in domestic law. These instruments
include all treaties signed by Canada, and those signed and ratified by
Canada. Throughout this article, we refer to non-implemented international

I.
See, generally, Jutta Brunnde & Stephen Toope, "A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of
International Law by Canadian Courts" (2002) 40 Can. Y.B. Int'l. Law 3; Gibran Van Ert, "Using
Treaties in Canadian Courts" (2000) 38 Can. Y.B. Int's. Law 3; France Houle, "La 1dgitimit6
constitutionnelle de la reception directe du droit international en droit canadien" (2004) 45 C. de D.
295; Iit Weiser, "Undressing the Window: Treating International Human Rights Law Meaningfully in
the Canadian Commonwealth System" (2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 113, Karen Knop, "Here and There:
International Law in Domestic Courts" (2000) 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 501; Anne Warner LaForest,
"Domestic Application of International Law in Charter Cases : Are We There Yet " (2004) 37 U.B.C.
L. Rev. 157; William A. Schabas & Stdphane Beaulac, InternationalHuman Rights and Canadian
Lav: Legal Commitment, Implementation andthe Charter,3d ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007)
at 84 and if; France Houle & Noura Karazivan, "Les rapports de relevance juridique entre les ordres
I6gislatifs canadien et international" (2008) I R.Q.D.C., <http://www.aqdc.org/volumes/pdf/houle-les
rapports de relevance juridique.pdf>.
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law as a body of treaty law which binds Canada on the international scene,
but which has not been implemented into Canadian law.
Under the dualist theory to which Canada adheres, only treaties
that have been implemented into domestic law are actually binding on
Canadian judges in a domestic setting. Consequently, as the orthodoxy
of the doctrine puts it, all other treaties or conventional instruments are
legally irrelevant. That is why the use of this category of international
instruments by domestic judges, notwithstanding the dualist orthodoxy,
triggers questions of constitutional and democratic legitimacy as it
involves the consideration, by courts, of instruments that have not been
transformed into law by the legislative branch.
In order to give greater certainty to this area of the law, and also perhaps
to provide a justification for the use of these materials, some authors have
suggested that the presumption of conformity-which already exists with
relation to domestic legislation aimed at fulfilling Canada's international
obligations-should be extended to include any unimplemented ratified
treaty.2 In other words, that absent a contrary legislative intention, judges
must presume compliance with these treaties whenever an issue of
interpretation of domestic law arises.
We have elsewhere shown a reticence with regard to the use of the
term presumption when it comes to explaining the new role of ratified but
unimplemented treaties in Canadian law.3 We agree that if it is plain that
domestic legislation aims at fulfilling Canada's international obligations;
even though the intention was not made explicit, international norms must
be determinative of either the meaning of a domestic statute or regulation
or the validity of administrative action taken under its authority. However,
when it is not plain that domestic legislation aims at fulfilling Canada's
international obligations (either explicitly or implicitly), the question
remains to which extent judges are nonetheless authorized to take into
consideration international norms in order to interpret the scope and limits
of a Canadian legal norm.
The Supreme Court decision in Baker4 addressed this important issue,
but also raised two problems which are not yet resolved in Canadian case
law. The first is with respect to the criteria to be applied by judges to
determine if it is open to them to take non-implemented international law
into consideration when interpreting Canadian legal norms. The second

2.
See discussion below at ns. 47 to 51.
3.
Houle & Karazivan, supra note 1.
4.
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, S.C.J. No. 39
[Baker].
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occurs when judges have decided that they can take into consideration
international legal norms to interpret Canadian legal norms even though
they have not been implemented into domestic law: what weight should be
given to these international norms?
To fully appreciate the problems raised by the Baker case, it is
important to distinguish between the use of international law to interpret
domestic ordinary legislation, and the use of international law to interpret
constitutional norms, in particular the rights and freedoms guaranteed. in
the Charter.
With respect to interpreting the scope of constitutional norms, it will
be open to judges to take international law norms into consideration when
the concepts used in Canadian constitutional law and international law
are similar.5 When such is the case, judges are entitled to give persuasive
value to these international norms to interpret Canadian constitutional
law.

6

When it comes to ordinary legislation, the question of when to resort to
non-implemented international law in interpreting Canadian legal norms
is less clear. Justice L'Heureux-Dubd stated in Baker that international
law norms "constitute a part of the legal context in which legislation is
enacted and read". Therefore, interpretations that reflect these values and
principles are to be preferred "[in] so far as possible."7
With respect to weight, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 appeared to lean
toward giving persuasive value to international norms that do not aim at
fulfilling Canada's international obligations when interpreting a domestic
statute or regulation. We say "appeared" because her reasons are not
crystal clear on this issue. This lack of clarity resulted in the development
of a fuzzy caselaw. Indeed, as we have shown previously, courts that are
presented with international law arguments sometimes refer to international
instruments as persuasive, relevant, useful, or quite often determinant.
As a consequence, the question of weight is still debated.8 Nonetheless,
the weight issue will not be the focal point of this text. Rather, we will
focus our attention on the first difficulty raised in Baker: when are judges
entitled to consider non-implemented international law norms to interpret
Canadian legal norms, and how do they proceed to do so?

5. Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), (1987] 1S.C,R. 313, S.C.J. No. 10, Dickson
C.C., dissenting [Re Public Service Employee Relations Act]. These reasons were later endorsed in
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, S.C.J. No. 45.
6. Ibid
7. Baker, supra note 4 at para. 70 [emphasis added].
8. Houle & Karazivan, supra note I.
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In our opinion, Baker both discards the traditional dualist reception
theory, and applies a new mechanism of relevancy that we call
harmonization of domestic law with international law.9 In Part I of this
article, we will analyze both the foundations of the dualist theory (section
1), and how this theory created the need to develop new ways of theorizing
the role of non-implemented international law. We will then highlight
how harmonization best describes the current interpretative process going
on in Baker and in the subsequent caselaw (section 2).
In Part II of the article, we will focus on how harmonization can
illustrate the relationship between international law and domestic law in
the field of Canadian immigration law. Immigration law offers a clear
example of the difficulties faced by judges when they are conferred
the explicit task of considering international law while interpreting a
statute-in this case,' the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act °
(IRPA). Of particular importance in this statute is s. 3(3)(f), for it directs
judges to construe and apply the IRPA in a manner that "complies with
international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory."
Parliament is using a wording that is quite strong and does not give
discretion to judges: "This Act is to be construedand appliedin a manner
that complies with internationalhuman rights instruments." However,
as our analysis will show, even if the language of Parliament is explicit,
judges have nonetheless started an interpretative process to limit the
scope of Parliament's injunction. In other words, even if s. 3(3)(f) of
the IRPA does not contain the words "in so far as possible," judges are
reading in this principle of interpretation stated in Baker. This is not so
surprising: after all, one can argue, any interpretative rule contained in an
enactment is to be read subject to a contrary legislative intention." But
instead of harmonizing the interpretationof the IRPA with international
.law, courts are harmonizing the applicationof the legislation as a whole
with international law. As we will show, this unexpected turn raises new
questions that transcend the traditional debate on the post-Baker use of
international law by courts and identifies a new technique, devised by
judges, to limit the impact of international law in the interpretation of
domestic law. Consequently, it may be argued that s. 3(3)(f) has been
reduced to a merely symbolic value.

9.
10.
11.

Ibid.
Immigrationand Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [Act or IRPA].
InterpretationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 15(2)(a) [InterpretationAct].
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Judges of both Federal Courts paid some attention to s. 3(3)(f) of the
12
IRPA since its coming into force in 2002. However, it is in the De Guzman
decision, rendered by Justice Evans of the Federal Court of Appeal, that
an analytical framework was explicitly laid down to guide judges in the
application of s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA. For this reason, we start our study of
relevant case law from the De Guzman decision (section 1), but we limit
our follow-up sample to the Federal Court of Appeal decisions (section
2). Our decision to limit the scope of our inquiry was mainly driven by
the exploratory nature of this article. There is no doubt that the Federal
Court of Appeal decisions post-De Guzman raise novel questions which
will justify a full-fledged investigation of all relevant cases but such an
.investigation is beyond the scope of the present contribution. 3
I. Reception doctrines in Canadianlaw
Canada follows a monist approach with regard to the reception of customary
law, and a dualist approach with regard to the reception of conventional
(treaty) law. It is the latter that concerns this article; the reception of
customary law will not be addressed. 4
Under the dualist approach, a treaty must be transformed or implemented into domestic legislation in order to become legally binding in
Canada. 5 This model takes into account the separation of powers as well
as the federal division of powers in Canada: the federal executive holds
the power to enact treaties, but the federal and provincial legislaturesdepending on the jurisdiction over the matter covered by the treaty-hold
the power to make that treaty into law. 16 The belief is that separation of
powers as well as the principle of federalism would be jeopardized if the
federal executive were able to do indirectly what it may not do directly,
i.e., enact a -law and trespass on provincial jurisdiction. 7

12. De Guzman v. Canada (Ministerof Citizenship andImmigration), 2005 FCA 436 leave to appeal
to S.C.C. refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 70 (June 22, 2006) [De Guzman].
13. A Quickcite of this decision on the Quicklaw database reveals that this case was cited 43 times
(mentioned in 40 cases, explained in 6 and followed in 2). Most cases involve either the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. However,
a preliminary observation which can be made is that-the De Guzman decision was also cited in cases
in which statutes other than the IRPA were pleaded. This may be an indication, which will need to
be verified, that the De Guzman analytical framework is perhaps being extended to other areas of
interpretation of domestic legal norms in light of non-implemented international law.
14. The monist approach to the reception of customary international law in Canada was clarified in
R. v. Hope, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 [Hape].
15. Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. CanadianRadio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
141 [CapitalCities].
16. Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 [Labour
Conventions Case].
17. J.-M. Arbour, Droit internationalpublic, 4th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2002) at 146.
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As a result of these beliefs, judges for a long time shared the view
that they had to determine if an international treaty was implemented in
Canadian domestic law before considering its weight in a given case. It
is only with the advent of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms
that .this traditional reception doctrine went through significant changes
and, as a consequence, opened the door to major developments leading
to the formulation of a contemporary reception doctrine of international
law norms in Canada. In this section, we start with a brief review of the
evolution of the traditional reception doctrine to differentiate the clearer
from the more obscure zones of this doctrine.
1. Evolution of the traditionalreception doctrine
An implemented treaty is part ofCanadian law. Yet questions ofinterpretation
may arise, and if they do, there is a presumption of conformity that binds
the courts. The courts must presume that the legislator had the intention to
conform in all points to the treaty unless the legislature explicitly intended
otherwise. To find clear formulation for this presumption, we turn to
English law, from which we inherited the dualist model of reception. In
Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Lord Diplock defines
the presumption as follows:
[T]he treaty, since English law is noi self-operating, remains irrelevant
to any issue in the English courts until.Her Majesty's Government has
taken steps by way of legislation to fulfil its treaty obligations.,Once
the Government has legislated ... , the court must in the first instance
construe the legislation .... If the terms of the legislation are clear and

unambiguous, they must be given effect to, whether or not they carry out
Her Majesty's treaty obligations .... But if the terms of the legislation
are not clear .... the treaty itself becomes relevant, for there is a prima

facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of
international law

.... 18

Lord Diplock adds'that it is not necessary that the legislation refer explicitly
to the treaty: it is sufficient that extrinsic evidence make it "plain that
the enactment was intended to fulfil Her Majesty "sobligations under a
particularconvention ... ".'9

The presumption of conformity thus stands for the proposition that
reference to international law is mandatory when analyzing implementing
legislation or legislation that is meant to fulfill the government's

18. Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116 (C.A.) at 143-144
[Salomon] [emphasis added].
19. Ibid. at 144 [emphasis added].
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international obligations. Such a position is summarized by the House of
Lords as follows:
Further cases in which the court may not only be empowered but
required to adjudicate upon the meaning or scope of the terms of an
international treaty arise where domestic legislation, although not
incorporating the treaty, nevertheless requires, either expressly or by
necessary implication, resort to be had to its terms for the purpose of
construing the legislation.2"
Once an explicit or implicit implementation was shown to the satisfaction
of a Court, a judge still had to determine whether Canadian domestic
norms needed to be interpreted. For a long time, the criterion to determine
if interpretation was required was to show that the norm at stake was
ambiguous. If so, international norms explicitly or implicitly implemented
could be used to clarify the ambiguity. This was the state of the law until
the advent of the Charter.
Very early in the new days of the Charter,the Supreme Court decided
that international human rights law norms, principles and jurisprudence
broadly speaking (thus, including regional norms such as those developed
in Europe) were relevant to interpret the scope of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed in it. This move was significant because the Court did not
argue that the framers explicitly or implicitly implemented international
norms into Canadian law. Therefore, the first point to be made here is
that in the context of the interpretation the Charter, the Supreme Court
moved away from the obligation to demonstrate implementation of an
international treaty before using the norms contained in it to interpret the
meaning of the Charter.
Second, instead of justifying the recourse to international law norms
on the basis of implementation, the Court reasoned on the basis of the
similarities between the concepts used in both sets of norms.2 ' This
point was particularly evident when judges were referring to European
human rights norms. Because of these similarities, the Court argued
that it was open for judges to use international law norms as an extrinsic
aid to interpretation. What is also noteworthy is that the Court pushed
aside the ambiguity criterion. Indeed, the nature of norms such as rights
and freedoms, that is to say being intrinsically ambiguous, vague and
20. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dept of Trade& Indus., [1990]2 A.C. 418, [1989] 3 W.L.R.
969 at 1002 (H.L.) [emphasis added].
21. See Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, supra note 5. Schabas and Beaulac report some
comments made by former Justices La Forest and Bastarache on the lasting impact of the words of
Justice Dickson in Re PublicService Employee Relations Act: see Schabas & Beaulac, supranote I at
87.
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obscure, was also viewed as crucial factor to make such a move. The
Court felt the need to resort to international human rights instruments
to help it in construing the scope and limits of our constitutional rights
and freedoms. It is worth recalling that the Court's departure from both
criteria-implementation and ambiguity-was viewed as quite radical at
22
that time.
In the context of the interpretation of domestic legal norms, however,
the Court still held the view, until Baker,that the criterion of implementation
(whether explicit or implicit) was a necessary one to fulfill. One example
of the application of the principle of "implicit implementation" can be
found in National Corn Growers Association v. Canada.23 In that case,
the Supreme Court clearly specified that it was handling the interpretation
of legislation aimed at fulfilling Canada's obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In such cases, recourse to the
GATT, i.e., to the underlying international agreement, was justified in
order to interpret a provision of the Canadian legislation.
However, the Court moved away from a rigid application of the criteria
of ambiguity. Indeed, in National Corn Growers, Gonthier J. alleviated
the requirements to be met before international law could be resorted to:
writing for the majority of the Court, he declared that international law
could be helpful to interpret domestic legislation even where the underlying
legislation shows no apparent ambiguity. In his opinion, the relevant treaty
could be helpful in orderto ascertainwhether the implementing legislation
was ambiguous. The findings are summarized as follows:
In interpreting legislation which has been enacted with a view towards
implementing international obligations, as is the case here, it is reasonable
for a tribunal to examine the domestic law in the context of the relevant
agreement to clarify any uncertainty. Indeed where the text of the domestic
law lends itself to it, one should also strive to expound an interpretation
which is consonant with the relevant international obligations.
Second, and more specifically, it is reasonable to make reference to an
international agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to determine if
there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation.24
As a result of National Corn Growers, the scope of the traditional
reception doctrine was changed with respect to the use of international

22. D. Turp, "Le recours au droit international aux fins de l'interpr~tation de la Charte canadienne
des droits et libert~s : un bilanjurisprudentiel" (1984) 18 R.J.T. 353.
23. National Corn Growers Association v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [ 1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, S.C.J.
No. 110 [National Corn Growers].
24. Ibid.
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legal norms to interpret domestic legal norms. Although implementation
was still viewed as a necessary criterion to meet, the proof of ambiguity
was greatly relaxed. When international law was deemed implemented,
Courts were entitled to presume that Parliament's intention was to conform
to norms contained in the international instrument.
However, this decision still left unanswered the question as to whether
domestic legal norms could be interpreted in light of non-implemented
international instruments just like constitutional norms. It appeared that
the rule stated in Francis v. The Queen25 and more famously in Capital
Cities,2 6 a case involving the interpretation of the BroadcastingAct, was
still applicable. Recall that in Capital Cities, the appellant pleaded that
Canadian law had to be interpreted in light of the Inter-American Radio
Communication Convention of 1937, or, at least, in a way that complies
with Canada's international obligations under this Convention. Applying
the English case of Salomon, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected that
plea, holding that because the BroadcastingAct neither implemented nor
referred to the international Convention, the Convention could have no
domestic consequences in Canada.27 In other words, the Court said that
non-implemented international instruments had no impact whatsoever
on the Canadian legislation. The Court clearly meant the presumption of
conformity did not apply to non-implemented treaties.
This is precisely where the Baker decision fits in, for it opened the
possibility of using non-implemented international law norms to interpret
the meaning of Canadian legal norms. In so doing, the Supreme Court
aligned the Charter case law and domestic case law with respect to the
first criterion: the lack of implementation of international norms is not an
excluding factor any more. The Court also arguably aligned Charterand
domestic case law with respect to the ambiguity criteria: Baker did not
refer to the existence of an explicit or latent ambiguity as in National Corn
Growers. Rather, the Court in Baker referred to similarities of values
between domestic and international law to justify recourse to the latter to
interpret the former.
2. Contemporary reception doctrine
Perhaps one may wonder why Canada has adopted the English reception
theory in the first place, a theory which reflects the fundamental importance
of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom.

25.
26.
27.

Francisv. The Queen, [1956] 1 S.C.R. 618.
Capital Cities, supra note 15.
Ibid. at 173.
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In fact, contrary to the situation prevailing in the U.K., 28 parliamentary
sovereignty has never been an absolute feature in Canadian constitutional
law. This is due to many factors: our history of colonization and the Colonial
Laws Validity Act, which made British laws supreme over colonial laws;
federalism and the division of powers which split parliamentary sovereignty
between federal and provincial parliaments; the written constitution which
includes an amending formula that goes beyond mere parliamentary
majority; and, lastly, the adoption of the Canadian Charterof Rights and
Freedoms in 1982, which authorized a judicial review of legislation based
on Charter grounds. Notwithstanding these limitations on parliamentary.
sovereignty in Canada, the dualist theory of reception has been imported
into Canadian law, and it is undeniably part our legal environment. Its
survival in the Canadian legal order may be due to the role it performs
in ensuring that the division of powers within the federation is protected.
Indeed, requiring the implementation by provincial legislatures of a treaty
which falls within their jurisdiction helps maintain that balance.2 9
Yet it would be an understatement to say that this theory has not been
applied faithfully and consistently by Canadian courts.30 Clearly, the case
in Baker marked the formal shift from this dualist approach to a new,
more modem approach. Yet Baker is itself torn between a majority and
a minority ruling. On the one hand, the dissenting judges, Iacobucci and
Cory JJ., followed the dualist approach and held that it was "well-settled
law that an international convention ratified by the executive branch of
government is of no force or effect within the Canadian legal system until
such time as its provisions have been incorporated into domestic law by
way of implementing legislation."'" On the other hand, the majority of
the Court, led by L'Heureux-Dub6 J., opined otherwise. For the seven
judges, although unimplemented treaties are not binding in Canada,
the courts may nonetheless refer to the values and principles enshrined

28. In England, Parliament has "the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, (...)
no person
or body is recognized in England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament":
see Albert Venn Dicey, Introductionto the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 1982) at 3-4; Dicey refers to the idea that the British Parliament has all powers, including the
power to legislate so that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered : Ibid at 33.
29. See Labour Conventions Case, supra note 16.
30. We must point out that the dualist theory is also undergoing transformations in England, notably
since the adoption of the Human Rights Act. Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act provides that "So
far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights." Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998,
c.42, s. 3(l). See e.g. Yuval Shany, "How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative
Analysis of the Influence of Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by
Domestic Courts" (2006) 31 Brook. J. Int'l L. 341.
31. Baker, supra note 4 at para. 81 (footnotes omitted).
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in these international human rights instruments when undertaking the
contextual analysis of the domestic legislation. This does not mean that
the presumption of conformity with underlying treaties has been extended
to all sorts of instruments, whether signed or ratified. Rather, it means
that those instruments that were previously totally discarded because nonimplemented, were suddenly admissible. The question then becomes how
best to theorize this new relationship of legal relevance.32
In an earlier contribution we suggested that harmonization of
domestic and international norms offers the potential to explain this new
relationship of legal relevance. We analyzed all Supreme Court cases that
both cite Baker and discuss the reception of treaty law in domestic law
between 1999 and 2007. 33 This survey allowed us to identify a free-style,
6 la carte type of reasoning that cannot support the conclusion that courts
are presuming compliance. Rather, the cases led us to observe a variety of
mechanisms, from presumption to harmonization to mere consideration
of international law in the interpretative process:
" In R. v. Sharpe,34 three concurring judges spoke of international
norms as not binding, but nonetheless "relevant sources" for
interpreting domestic legislation On the prohibition of possession
of child pornography, while the six judges writing the majority
opinion failed to mention international law.35
*

In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v.
Canada,36 the Court interpreted the Criminal Code provision on
the reasonable force that can be used on children. The Court held
that what is reasonable "may be derived from international treaty
obligations"37 and that statutes "should be construed"38 in a manner
so as to conform to Canada's international obligations.

•

In Society of Composers,39 the Court wrote that non-implemented

32. We borrow this expression from Santi Romano, L 'ordrejuridique (Paris: Dalloz, 1975). Romano
believes there are as many legal orders as there are institutions, and that the State is only one institution
among others that can create law. In Romano's view, when the existence or efficacy of one legal order
is contingent upon the conditions set out by another legal order, we may speak of legal relevance
among these two orders.
33. Houle & Karazivan, supra note 1. That research focused on ordinary legislation and did not
include cases which analyzed the interpretation of the CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms.
34. R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] I S.C.R. 45.
35. Ibid. at para. 175.
36. CanadianFoundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada(Attorney General), 2004 SCC
4, [2004] 1S.C.R. 76.
37. Ibid.atpara.31.
38. Ibid.
39. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. CanadianAssn. of Internet

Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427.
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40
international norms are "relevant" in interpreting national law,
while adding that Parliament
is "presumed" not to legislate against
4
international law generally. '

In GreCon Dimter inc. v. JR. Normand inc.,42 the Court interpreted
sections of the Civil Code of Qudbec which implemented private
international law. Instead of applying the presumption of conformity,
as the implementation would entail, it spoke of harmonizing 43the
Civil Code with Canada and Qudbec's international obligations.
And finally, in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),44 the Court was interpreting the Criminal Code
provision on. the crime of genocide. The Court noted that this
provision "incorporates, almost word for word, the definition of
genocide found in art.. II of the Genocide Convention "45-a treaty
ratified by Canada. The Court held that it is important that domestic
law be interpreted in accordance with the principles of international
customary law as well as Canada's treaty obligations, and added that
in this context, "international sources ... are highly relevant to the
analysis. '46 The Court was silent on the existence or application of
any presumption of conformity.
Many authors have attempted to make sense of this gap between traditional
theory and emerging practice, trying to elaborate a theory that better
describes the role of international law in domestic courts. Some believe that
all ratified treaties, whether implemented or not, trigger a "presumption of
conformity" 47 which means that reference to these treaties by courts is
mandatory; others acknowledge that such a presumption does not currently
exist, or note the ambiguity of the situation, but would encourage the
extension of the presumption of conformity to ratified but unimplemented
treaties48 ; some do not distinguish between ratified or signed treaties
and seem to apply the presumption to all of these instruments,4 9 while
others believe that Courts should be free to grant any meaning to a non-

40. Ibid. at para. 150.
41. Ibid.
42. GreCon Dimter Inc. v. JR. Normand Inc., 2005 SCC 46, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 401.
43. Ibid. at para. 39, 41.
44. Mugesera v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R.
100.
45. Ibid. at para. 82.
46. Ibid. •
47. See Brunn6e & Toope, supra note I at 32.
48. See Weiser, supra note I at para. 44 and Van Ert, supra note I at 36, n. 112.
49. Ruth Sullivan's famous formulation of the rule of reception holds that "the legislature is presumed
to comply with the obligations owed by Canada as a signatory of international instruments" (emphasis
added). See R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 41 ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2002) at 422. •
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implemented treaty based on its persuasive authority in the case at bar.5 0
Finally, some authors argue that the contextual approach to statutory
interpretation makes sufficient room for international law, treating it as
part of the general context of adoption.' All in all, the number of theories
put forward seems proportional to the variety ofjudicial approaches to that
question.
In our view, the use of the term "presumption" incorrectly describes
the way non-implemented international law makes its way into Canadian
law. The term presumption should be reserved for implementing
legislation, or for legislation that aims at fulfilling Canada's obligations
under international law. A presumption is not optional. It is not a synonym
for "useful," "helpful," or "relevant." It is a rule of law that refers to a
mandatory exercise, one that requires the judge to draw a particular
inference from a particular set of facts.5" It is neither conditional, nor
discretionary. It is unable to correctly account for what courts actually
do because international law creates no obligation on States to conform to
ratified treaties through their domestic legisiation. 3 With non-implemented
international law, States cannot invoke provisions .of their domestic law
to justify non-compliance with international law, but they need not make
their domestic law conform to international law.
In our opinion, neither Baker nor the caselaw following Baker shows
that non-implemented international instruments trigger a mandatory
presumption. It is clear that a meaning in accordance with international
law ought to be preferred, in order to avoid placing Canada in violation of
its international obligations, but it is not a mandatory exercise. Therefore,
it is both more useful and more accurate to reserve the use of the term
"presumption" to implemented treaties. In this regard, we agree with
Mayo Moran's views that the presumption of conformity is "too indebted

50. Knop, supra note I at 525 and LaForest, supra note I at para. 51-52.
51. Schabas & Beaulac, supra note 1.
52. L. Ducharme, Pr&is de la preuve (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2005) at 221. A rebuttable
presumption of law "compels the trier of fact
to assume the existence or non-existence of the presumed
fact in the absence of evidence to the contrary": see Alan W. Bryant et al., Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant
- The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3d ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2009) at §4.25 (e-book). At
para. 4.28, the authors, citing Wigmore, add that "a rebuttable presumption is a 'rule of law compelling
the trier of fact to reach the conclusion in the absence ofevidence to the contrary.' (emphasis in text).
53. Houle & Karazivan, supra note I at n. 71: "I s'agit done ici pour I'Etat canadien de s'assurer
que son droit interne n'est pas en conflit avec lesnormes contenues dans letraite. I s'agit donc en
quelque sorte d'une obligation n~gative. I1n'a pas A rendre son droit interne positivement conforme
au droit international, Amoins que laloi ne le prdvoie expressdment." See also Mayo Moran, "Shifting
Boundaries: The Authority of International Law" cited in Janne Nijman & Andr6 Nollkaemper, New
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Lav (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) at 163, 184
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to the traditional picture and the unique salience of binding rules to be
adequate as an account of what courts are doing when they have recourse
to non-domestically binding international law"54 and that a new role for
these non-implemented norms must be developed outside the positivist
box which polarizes binding and non-binding law.
As to which mechanism better describes the new role of nonimplemented international law, Moran suggests that the use of ratified
treaties be better characterized as "attentiveness to the overall scheme
of values and principles embodied in the Convention."55 Inspired by
Australian jurisprudence, Moran argues that the conceptual tool used by
courts is the doctrine of legitimate expectations, a doctrine which allows
for both a mandatory reference to these instruments, and a values-based
6
approach.1
Contrary to Moran, we do not consider that judges perceive the
reference to such instruments as mandatory, nor do we believe that the
theory of legitimate expectations best explains what they do." Rather, we
suspect that courts attempt to harmonize domestic legislation with nonimplemented international law, and that they are currently in the process
of constructing the legal .criteria that better determine cases under which
judges may consider harmonization possible. Recall that in Baker,Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd referred to the similarity of values and of principles
between international law and domestic law, and stressed that "in so far as
possible," it is preferable to adopt interpretations that correspond to these
values and principles.
Harmonization is the expression of this realm of possibility within
which two texts can be read together: outside of this realm, it is impossible
to harmonize, and the "in so far as possible" caveat applies. Martin
Boodman defines harmonization as a "flexible concept composed of an
array of measures that may vary depending on the context within which
each question is dealt with. It may mean that the relevant legislation is
very similar in terms of basic principles but different as to the specific
provisions of the other body of law."58 Thus harmonization may depend on
a finding of certain proximity between the legislation and the treaty. It also
54. Moran, ibid.at 163, 184.
55. Ibid. at 169.
56. Ibid. at 187.
57. The doctrine of legitimate expectations has not been recognized as creating substantive rights;
the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the application of that presumption in Baker but the point was
not discussed in the Supreme Court's judgment.
58. M. Boodman, "The Myth of Harmonization of Laws", cited in Droit Contemporain,Association
canadienne de droit compard et Association qurbrcoise de droit compar6 (Dir.) (Cowansville, QC:
Yvon Blais, 1992) at 129.
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allows each instrument to retain its specificity: according to Goldstein,
harmonization is "a process through which several elements are combined
or adapted to one another in order to create a coherent whole, while allowing
each provision to retain its singleness."5 9 This is why harmonization is
highly contextual.
All in all, whether one chooses the mechanism of a presumption or
that of harmonization, it now appears clear that general statements such
as that "the legislature is presumed to comply with instruments to which
Canada is a signatory" are of very little help when one tries to make sense
of the evolution of the dualist theory.6" Nor do general references to the
"well-established principle" that "Canadian law is presumed to comply
with international law" 61 provide useful guidance as they do not specify
whether one talks about implementing legislation or not, about ratified
treaties or not.
In our view, harmonization describes accurately the process through
which non-implemented international law makes its way into our domestic
law-but the question of how such harmonization is to be conducted
remains open. In the next part, we will consider s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA, a
provision which does not seem to leave open the "in so far as possible"
caveat. Nonetheless, as we shall see, these words have been construed
in the Act. What is more, the interpretation of domestic law with regard
to international law took an unexpected turn: instead of interpretingthe
impugned provision, the Federal Court, in several cases, embarked upon
an evaluation of the conformity of the applicationof the whole Act with
international law. In other words, instead of harmonizing the interpretation
of the IRPA with international law, the Court is harmonizing the application
of the legislation with international law. This surprising-and potentially
hazardous--development is the focus of the next part.
II. Case study on s. 3(3)0W of the IRPA
A major law reform followed Baker, and, in 2002 the new IRPA was
adopted. Section 3(3) f) provides that the Act is to be "construed and applied
in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to
which Canada is a signatory." We can recognize Sullivan and Driedger's
wording6 2 and, more precisely, the use of the term "signatory"-which
59. G. Goldstein, "L'expdrience canadienne en matiere d'uniformisation, d'harmonisation et de
coordination des droits" (1998) 32 R.J.T. 235 [translated by author].
60. See Sullivan, supra note 49 at 422. This is especially true considering the fact that some of the
authorities cited in support of this formulation of the presumption of conformity are Salomon and
Francis,two cases that stand for the formal dualist approach.
61. Hape, supra note 14 at para. 53, LeBel J.
62. See above, n. 49.
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includes instruments that are not binding on Canada in international law, as
well as instruments which are binding on Canada in international law. This
wording creates apotential source of ambiguity that did not go unnoticed
63
by some judges.
Section 3(3)(f of the IRPA does not incorporate or implement
international treaties in immigration law,64 nor does it refer to any specific
convention. Yet it is a reminder of the importance of international law
in interpreting and applying immigration legislation. The precise nature
of the role of non-implemented international law in the interpretation of
domestic law in light of s. 3(3)(0 was recently defined by the Federal
Court of Appeal.
In De Guzman,65 the Court, with Evans J.A. writing, addressed the
question of the reception of international law in domestic courts and
acknowledged the evolution of the traditional dualist theory. The Court
considered the "burgeoning" common law and openly rejected the Capital
Cities dualist approach which made no room for ratified, unimplemented
treaties. That approach was qualified as "older. 6 6 According to the Court,
the interpretation of s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA must take into account the
evolution of this burgeoning common law. As to the proper interpretation
to be given to s. 3(3)(f), the Court went on to hold that consideration of
international instruments to which Canada is a party was mandatory,and
that some instruments were determinant of the meaning of Canadian
legislation unless the legislator specifically intended otherwise. How or to
what extent it effectively proceeded to apply these interpretative statements
will be discussed below.
1. The FederalCourt of Appeal s decision in De Guzman
The facts of the case are simple. The appellant is a Canadian citizen who
was denied application to sponsor the admission to Canada of her two sons
living in the Philippines. Despite the fact that her sons were obviously
family members, the officer held that they were not part of the family class
because their mother had not disclosed their existence when she initially
applied for permanent resident status. Thus, her application was rejected
under s. 11 7(9)(d) ofthe ImmigrationandRefugee ProtectionRegulations.6 7
The appellant pleaded that s. 11 7(9)(d), to the extent that it denies family

63. De Guzman, supra note 12 at para. 76, Evans J.A.
64. Munar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1t80, [2005] F.C.J. No.
1448.
65. De Guzman, supra note 12.
66. Ibid. at para. 63.
67. Immigration and Refugee ProtectionRegulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].
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reunion, is invalid because it is contrary to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter
ofRights and Freedoms. She also argued that this provision is inconsistent
with Canada's international obligations under human rights treaties, which
protect the right of families to live together as well as the best interests of
the child.
More specifically, the appellant alleged that s. 117(9) is invalid
because it renders the IRPA non-compliant with international human rights
instruments to which Canada is a signatory, contrary to s. 3(3)(f) of the
IRPA. Ms. De Guzman argued that because of s. 3(3)(f), instruments such
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child must prevail over conflicting
IRPA provisions. The trial judge dismissed her claim, holding that
"paragraph 3(3)(0 merely requires the Court to consider the international
human rights instruments relevant in this case as context when interpreting
ambiguous provisions of the immigration act. '68 Since, in that case, s..
117(9) was found "plain, clear and unambiguous," there was no need to
refer to international law, even as an interpretative aid.
On appeal, the Court overturned the trial judge's finding that nonimplemented international treaties are "merely context" or that an ambiguity
must be found in the text prior to referring to international law. Evans
J.A. concluded that s. 3(3)(0 attaches more than "ambiguity-resolving,
contextual significance to international human rights instruments to which
' In other words, s. 3(3)(f) applies, of course, when
Canada is signatory."69
an ambiguity needs to be resolved and in such case international norms
and values can be used to clarify the meaning of the IRPA and IRPR.
However, finding an ambiguity is no longer necessary as a prerequisite
to the interpretation of the international norms encompassed by s. 3(3)(f).
All in all, Evans J.A. found that the trial judge's view "does not take
proper account of the expanding role that the common law has given to
international law in the interpretation of domestic law" in recent years.70
In order to outline what would be a proper account of this expanding
role, the Court examined the scope of s. 3(3)(f) in two steps. The first step
was quickly dealt with: Ms. De Guzman was asking for a declaration of
invalidityof s. 11 7(9)(d) on account ofit causing the IRPA to be incompatible
with international law. The Court said that no such declaration would be
given, lest international law would have precedence over domestic law.

68. De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1276, [2005] 2
F.C.R. 162 at para. 53.
69. Ibid. at para 83.
70. De Guzman, supra note 12 at para. 62.
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So 'the first point was that non-implemented international human rights
instruments do not prevail over conflicting IRPA provisions.
But that non-implemented international law does not prevail over
Canadian law does not mean that it plays no interpretative role. In the
second step, Evans J.A. went on to develop the analytical framework
that will help establish the role of non-implemented international law as
interpretativenorms in the context of the IRPA.
He made several findings in this regard. First of all, s. 3(3)(f) IRPA
directs courts to take mandatory action. There is no discretion involved.
Evans J.A. even stresses the words "is to be." Evans J.A. goes on to say
that "[IfI interpretedliterally," s. 3(3)(f) makes international instruments
"determinative of the meaning of the IPRA, in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to the contrary."'" However, Evans J.A.'s ratio decidendi
with respect to the determinative weight of international instruments
applies only to treaties to which Canada is a signatory and that are binding
on Canada in international law.72 These instruments are binding either
"because they do not require ratification or because Canada has signed
and ratified them. 7 3 Evans J.A. did not make a finding with respect to
instruments that are not binding Canada in international law,74 only a
comment which has therefore the value of an obiter dictum. He wrote
that he was inclined to think that Parliament "intended them to be used as
persuasive and contextual factors in the interpretation and application of
the IPRA. 75
Second, instruments that are binding on Canada in international law
Will be determinant only "in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the
contrary."76 This means that if the legislator specifically wished to have a
certain provision be given meaning not according to international law, he
should say so explicitly. Here, Evans J.A. seems to be applying the rule
of interpretation found in s. 15(2)(a) in the InterpretationAct, according
to which "Where an enactment contains an interpretation se'ction or
provision, it shall be read and construed (...) as being applicable only if a
contrary intention does not appear."77
Third, Evans J.A. holds that the question that must be answered is
that of the compliance of the whole Act with international law. When

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ibid. at para. 75 (emphasis added).
Ibid. at para. 87.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 88.
Ibid. at para. 89.
Ibid. at para. 75.
InterpretationAct, supra note 11,s. 15(2)(a).
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it comes to making such determination, the Court points out that s.
3(3)(f) does not require "that each and every provision of the IRPA and
Regulations, considered in isolation," comply with these norms.78 The
Court thus announces that it is going to attempt to harmonize both:
"Rather, the question is whether an impugned statutory provision, when
considered together with others, renders the IPRA non-compliant" with
these norms.7 9
Why is the compliance of the Act's application with international
law surfacing at that point of the judgment? Recall that the Court was
in the process of establishing the role of human rights instruments "as
interpretative norms."80 Yet the text of the provision is sufficiently clear,
it appears, so that no interpretative effort is effectively undertaken by the
Court of Appeal to ascertain its meaning. Rather, the Court attempts to
ascertain whether the whole act applies in a way that is complying with
international law. So in the prescription of 3(3)(f), which holds that "this
Act is to be construed and applied," the application of the law seems to
gain precedence over the interpretationof the Act. This is an important
point because it has an impact on how the analytical framework devised
by Justice Evans should be conceived and applied.
To sum up, the steps which now should be followed to analyze an
issue falling under the scope of s. 3(3)(f) are the following:
• First, a judge must determine if the non-implemented international
law instrument is binding on Canada in internationallaw or not.
* Second, if binding on Canada, the norms and values contained
in this instrument are determinative of how the IRPA and IRPR
must be interpreted and applied. However, this will be so only
in the absence of a contrary legislative intention. Therefore, a
judge must check if there is a contrary legislative intention clearly
expressed in the IRPA and its regulations directing a judge to
determine that the norms and values contained in the instrument
are not determinative.
* Third, if no such legislative intention exists, then a judge must
check if the impugned statutory or regulatory provision, when
considered together with others, renders the IRPA non-compliant
with these international law norms. To conduct this inquiry, ajudge
must distinguish between arguments based on the non-compliance
of statutory or regulatory provisions.

78. Idid.atpara. 8 1.
79. Ibid.
80. This section starts at para. 61 of the judgment and runs until para. 89.
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In the case of a statutory provision, judges must consider
"whether other provisions in the IRPA mitigate its impact on a

right guaranteed by an international human rights instrument
to which Canada is signatory."'" It is clear that the mitigating
factor introduced by Evans J.A. is to be understood as referring
to the application of the IRPA, not the interpretation of the
impugned provisions. Indeed, it is simply odd to speak of
"mitigating the interpretation" of any rule of law.
M If the IRPA is found compliant, the inquiry ends there.8 2
0
If the IRPA is found non-compliant, Evans J.A. does not
specify what happens, but it is clear that international
instruments cannot be used to declare legislative provisions
invalid as they do not prevail over legislation83 nor have a
supra-legislative value.
P. In the case of a regulatory provision, the Court must proceed to
the same examination. But if it determines that the impugned
regulatory provision renders the IRPA non-compliant, it
must undertake a second inquiry.84 The Court must look at
the enabling section in the IRPA and determine whether it
authorizes the enactment of a regulation that puts the IRPA in
breach of a binding instrument to which Canada is signatory.85
It will be open for a Court to conclude that the regulationmaking power could lawfully be exercised in a manner
which renders the IRPA non-compliant only when there is
86
a clear legislative intention warranting such a conclusion.
Otherwise, the regulation will be found invalid in light of its
enabling legislation.
In applying the framework to the case at bar, the Court made it clear that it
was dealing with ratified instruments, binding on Canada in international
law, and not instruments that were merely signed by Canada.87 Therefore,
the norms and values contained in this instrument are determinative of
how the IRPA and IRPR must be interpreted and applied. In other words, if
several meanings can be attributed to a single provision, the meaning which
corresponds to Canada's treaty obligations must be preferred. The Court

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Ibid. at
Ibid. at
Ibid. at
Ibid. at
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. at

para. 91(emphasis added).
para 92.
para. 56.
para. 92

para. 94.
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implicitly concluded that there was no "contrary legislative intention" that
international law should not be determinative of the meaning of the Act,
as it proceeded directly to assess whether s. 11 7(9)(d) of the Regulations
renders the IRPA generally inconsistent with international human rights
instruments. In order to do so, the Court considered two rights recognized
by international instruments to which Canada is a party: the right to family
life, provided under s. 17 of the International Covenant. on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the principle of the best interests of the
child, codified in Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Court held that the right to family life was not infringed by s.
11 7(9)(d) since the separation between Ms. De Guzman and her sons was
not attributable to Canada but to her leaving her sons in Philippines, and
coming to Canada without disclosing their presence.8 8 Even if the impugned
provision actually prevents Ms. De Guzman from sponsoring her sons,
such limiting effect is alleviated by the presence of other ways, under the
Act, to achieve unification, for example through a s. 25 application on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds.8 9
The Court then moved on to consider whether the impugned provision
violates the principle of the best interests of the child, codified in Article
3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Again, the Court felt that
there were other provisions in the IRPA such as s. 25 which allowed for the
consideration of the best interests of the child throughout the immigration
process. Given the finding that "not every statutory provision must be able
to pass the "best interests of the child" test, if another provision requires
their careful consideration," 9° the Court found the IRPA and its regulations
to be generally compliant with international law.
Upon finding that s. 11 7(9)(d), if read with other provisions of the Act,
did not make the IRPA non-compliant with international law, the Court
felt it was not necessary to move to the inquiry as to whether the enabling
provision in the IRPA can be interpreted as "not authorizing the making of
a regulation that renders the IRPA non-compliant."'
As noted above, what the Court effectively did in the third step of
the analysis was to move away from the question of the interpretation
of the impugned provision, to that of the applicationof the Act. In other
words, the Court was at no point trying to ascertain the meaning of s.
88. Ibid. at para. 96.
89. This provision allows the Minister to grant an exemption from the strict application of permanent
residence requirements based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Hereinafter, we refer to s.
25 as H&C application.
90. Ibid. at para. 105.
91. Ibid. at para. 109.
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11 7(9)(d) by choosing among several meanings one which corresponds to
Canada's international obligations-even though the Court had announced
earlier that it had no discretion in this regard. Indeed, the meaning of this
provision seems clear for the Court, just as it was for the application judge.
But contrary to the application judge, the Appeal Court did not wish to rest
its conclusions on a finding of clear legislative drafting. What the Appeal
Court effectively did was to consider the application of the IRPA, from the
beginning until the end, to evaluate whether at some point or another in
the immigration process, some provisions allowed for the consideration of
the rights guaranteed by the international instruments at stake. It is clear
that s. 25 of the IRPA fulfills this role at least when it comes to considering
the best interests of the child. Therefore, it is hard to imagine how the
Act can be said to be generally non-compliant with international law in
its application as long as s. 25 is standing and the best interests of the
child are alleged. And since a finding of compliance is sufficient to dismiss
the claim based on s. 3(3)(f), one may conclude that the Court actually
eviscerated the interpretation dimension of s. 3(3)(f), and transformed an
inquiry regarding the interpretation of a certain provision, into a inquiry as
to the general application of the law.
2. Developments after De Guzman
The Court in De Guzman adopted a model that sought to harmonize domestic
legislation with international law by considering the relationship between
the Act as a whole and international law and the possibility of reconciling
the former with the latter in the absence of a contrary legislative intention.
But when it came to applying this model, what the Court actually did was
to engage in an evaluation of whether the IRPA and its regulations, in their
application, complied with international law. As the analysis of the Federal
Court of Appeal cases discussing De Guzman will show, this strategy has
been followed by the appeal justices with puzzling results. Five Appeal
court decisions discussed De Guzman, and these cases constitute our
sample.
In Varga v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),92 the
Court of Appeal was interpreting s. 112(1) of the IRPA which provides
that only those persons subject to removal can apply for protection.
Accordingly, Canadian-born children of persons subject to removal,
being ineligible for removal, can neither apply for-protection nor have
their best interests considered. The Court, Evans J. writing, cited De

92. Varga v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 394, [2006] F.C.J. No.
1828 [ Varga].
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Guzman for the proposition that not each and every provision of the IRPA
must be analyzed in light of international obligations; rather, the Act as a
whole must be considered compliant. According to the Court, the Act did
provide, through s. 25, for an effective opportunity to consider the best
interests of affected children, including the Canadian-born ones. It was
thus unnecessary that s. 112(1) be judicially expanded in order to include
Canadian-born children in the category of persons admissible to request a
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA).
93
In Idahosav. Canada (PublicService and Emergency Preparedness),
the Federal Court of Appeal was handling the interpretation of s. 50(a)
of the IRPA, a provision allowing that a "removal order is stayed ... if
a decision that was made in a judicial proceeding ... would be directly
contravened by the enforcement of the removal order." A week before her
removal from Canada, the appellant obtained a court order of temporary
custody of her children and a prohibition of their removal from Ontario.
She then proceeded to argue that this court order would be directly
contravened if she were removed from Canada. The appellant relied
on De Guzman to argue that s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA requires that "only
the plainest statutory language will warrant an interpretation that would
violate Canada's international legal obligations." 94 Since s. 50(a) does
not contain such specific language, the appellant argued that it "must be
interpreted consistently with international human rights instruments,"95 for
example, instruments protecting the best interests of the child and family
relationships, and that it should be read as imposing a stay on her removal
in order to protect the best interest of her children.
The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed. After reviewing the text,
context and purpose of the impugned provision, for the "only issue to be
decided in this appeal was the interpretation of IRPA, s. 50(a), which is a
question of law", 96 the Court examined the impact of s. 3(3)(f). According
to Evans J.A., the assessment of whether a statutory provision violates
international human rights law must be made "on the basis of the statute
as a whole" and not by considering the specific provision. As the IRPA
provides "other opportunities for the consideration of the best interests of
the children of those subject to deportation," including a s. 25 application,
it was not necessary to interpret s. 50(a) in a manner to give effect to these
international obligations. The interpretation that was chosen is a narrow
93.
No.
94.
95.
96.

Idahosa v. Canada (PublicSercice and Emergency Preparedness),2008 FCA 418, [2008] F.C.J.
1800 [Idahosa].
Ibid. at para. 51:
Ibid. at para. 52.
Ibid. at para. 16.
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one: s. 50(a) ought to be interpreted as not enabling non-nationals to defer
their removal by invoking custody orders which they obtained to avoid
being removed.
In these two cases, the rulings were drafted by Evans, J.A., and
both applied the analysis set forth in De Guzman, placing the impugned
provision in the overall legislative scheme and finding that general
compliance of the Act with international law was sufficient to meet the
para. 3(3)(f) prescription. In both cases, s. 25 of the IRPA (H&C) was
invoked as a provision giving sufficient opportunity to consider these
rights. Now what exactly is required by an immigration officer handling
.a s. 25 application? The answer is provided in Canada-(Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Okoloubu.97 This case concerned the determination of an

immigration officer's jurisdiction to consider international law instruments
in an application under s. 25 (1) of the IRPA. At stake was the jurisdiction
of the officer to consider the ICCPR,9 a treaty ratified by Canada, in a
s. 25 application. The respondent pleaded that s. 3(3)(f) mandated an
examination of these provisions-a task which was allegedly not performed
by the officer-and a conclusion that family-related interests must prevail
absent countervailing considerations.
The Federal Court granted the motion for judicial review and held
that the officer failed to properly examine international instruments.
The Federal Court of Appeal overruled the decision and applied De
Guzman. The Court cited Evans J.A.'s finding that s. 3(3)(f) "directs that
the Act must be construed and applied in a manner that complies with"
international treaties,99 but ultimately read it as "meaning that [the values
enshrined in the ICCPR] must inform the decision of the officer."' 00 The
Court also found that s. 3(3)(f) does not require that specific reference to
the international human rights instruments be made. It is sufficient that
the H&C officer "have those interests in mind" when dealing with a s. 25
application. As the officer did have these interests in mind, there was no
reason to displace her judgment.
In Thiara v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),0 1 the Federal
Court of Appeal also cited De Guzman in the context of a s. 25 application.
In that case, the Court rejected the appellant's argument that if the officer

97. Okoloubu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 326, [2008] F.C.J.
No. 1495 [Okoloubu].
98. At issue was the right to family life codified in articles 17, 23 and 24 of the ICCPR.
99. Ibid at para. 37.
100. Ibid. at para. 50 (emphasis added).
101. Thiara v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 151, [2008] F.C.J. No.
668 [Thiara].
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had construed the best interests of the child in a manner compliant with
human rights instruments, she would have concluded that the exemption
should be given. The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge's opinion
that the best interests of the child are an important factor, but not the only
relevant factor in the determination of a s. 25 application. Moreover, the
Court of Appeal found that s. 3(3)(f) does not require that an immigration
officer specifically refer to international human rights instruments when
considering a s. 25 application. Rather, it is sufficient that "the Officer
2
addresses the substance of the issues raised."'1

The first two cases show that s. 3(3)(f) merely requires that the Act,
when its application is considered as a whole, complies with international
instruments to which Canada is a party. They also show that s. 25 IRPA
(H&C) is conveniently used in order to satisfy this requirement. In
our view, this route is problematic from an interpretation point of view.
Indeed, it is important to recall that s. 3(3)(f) requires that "[t]his Act is
to be construed and applied [and not construed or applied] in a manner
that complies with international human rights instruments." The French
version of the IRPA is to the same effect. 103 Therefore, a court cannot
avoid interpreting a provision of the Act and merely focus on ascertaining
whether the Act as a whole complies with international law.
What is more, the narrow interpretation given to s. 25 in the abovementioned caselaw sheds doubts as to the ability of that section to fulfill the
role of ensuring that the application of the IRPA as a whole complies with
international human rights law. As the cases that we examined point out,
and rightly so, the best interests of the child form one consideration and
not necessarily one that prevails over other considerations. Baker is clear
on this point: "That is not to say that children's best interests must always
outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be other reasons for
denying an H & C claim even when children's interests are given this
consideration."'" However, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also stressed in her
reasons that "[t]he principles discussed above indicate that, for the exercise
of the discretion to fall within the standard of reasonableness, the decisionmaker should consider children's best interests as an importantfactor
give them substantialweight, andbe alert, alive and sensitive to them."' 5

102. Ibid. at para. 9.
103. Loi sur I'immigration et la Protection des Rfugijs, L.C. 2001, c. 27, art. 3 : L'interprdtation
et la mise en oeuvre de la pr~sente Ioi doivent avoir pour effet : f) de se conformer aux instruments
intemationaux poitant sur les droits de I'homme dont le Canada est signataire.
104. Baker, supra note 4 at para. 75.
105. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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This statement goes farther than merely requesting that the officer "keep in
mind" the international rights at stake.
In sum, it appears that the analysis set forth in De Guzman is problematic
for two reasons: on the one hand, the Act requires that it be "construed and
applied", and not merely applied in conformity with international law. It is
thus insufficient for the Court to limit the analysis to one of compliance of
the Act with international law. On the other hand, the compliance analysis
promises more than it delivers as it rests upon a diluted version of s. 25.
Instead of requesting that children's best interests be given substantial
weight and that an officer should be .alert alive and sensitive to them,
the Court now merely requires that these interests be "kept in mind." In
other words, the interpretation of s. 25, with respect to the best interests
of children, is drifting progressively away from Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's
reasons in Baker. In this light, it is not all that obvious that the compliance
analysis, to the extent it rests on the diluted interpretation of the H&C
provision, possess this "magic effect" that the Federal Court of Appeal
believes it has.
The last decision that we examine is even more puzzling in its
interpretation of the case law and raises serious concerns about the
protection afforded to individuals in Canada who are deemed to represent
a threat to our national security.
In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), °6 Mr.
Charkaoui alleged that the"Pre-Removal Risk Assessment provisions
breach the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Bill
ofRights and Canada's international obligations, including the Convention
against Torture which prohibits return to torture. Mr. Charkaoui applied
initially for a PRRA which was denied by the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration on account of a lack of substantive risk of torture. The
Minister's delegate added however that if she were underestimating the
risk of torture, the exceptional circumstances test provided in the IRPA
would justify the appellant's removal to Morocco "despite the danger of
torture."' 107 It is the validity of these "exceptional circumstances" that Mr.
Charkaoui challenged before the Federal Court of Appeal. Mr. Charkaoui
was well aware that in Suresh v. Canada,' the Supreme Court of Canada
had not excluded "the possibility that in exceptional circumstances,
deportation to face torture might be justified." Yet he argued before the

106. Charkaouiv. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 80, [2007] FC.J. No. 269 leave
to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 65205 (February 22, 2007) [Charkaoui].
107. Ibid at para. 2.
108. Suresh v. Canada, 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.
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Federal Court of Appeal that this ruling had to be revisited in light of s.
3(3)(f) IRPA which was inexistent at the time of Suresh.
The Federal Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Referring to De
Guzman, it agreed that international conventions to which Canada is a
signatory are determinative of the interpretation of the Act, but only "in
the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary."' °9 The Court of
Appeal endorsed the trial judge's conclusion that in that case, the impugned
provisions expressly stipulate a balancing process 1' ° in accordance with
the Suresh decision. Therefore, since the IRPA and its regulation regarding
PRRA are constitutionally valid, s. 3(3)(f) cannot have the effect of
overturning this finding. The case was dismissed on these grounds, too
hastily perhaps. Recall that De Guzman's analytical framework required
that a court checks if the impugned statutory or regulatory provision,
when considered together with others, renders the IPRA non-compliant
with these international law norms (the third step). Justice Desjardins did
not consider this part of the analytical framework and one may question
whether she did not do so because the Court of Appeal decision "had not
yet been rendered when the designated judge made his decision.""' This
argument would be puzzling for three reasons.
First, at common law, cases that are qualified "jurisprudence" have a
declaratory character. Appeal courts are required to apply them whether
or not they have been pleaded before the trial or application court (for
example, because the new jurisprudence did not exist at that time as in the
case at bar)." 2 Second, this is a formalistic argument and one that should
be avoided in a case such as Charkaouiwhen the decision could result in
the possible torture of a Canadian permanent resident. Third, recall that
a security certificate was issued by the Minister against Mr. Charkaoui,
but that a decision as to its reasonableness had not yet been rendered at
the time Justice Desjardins made her decision. Therefore, there was no
clear decision stating that Mr. Charkaoui was indeed posing a threat to
the security of Canada. In addition, the validity of the whole security
certificate process was under scrutiny by the Supreme Court of Canada at
the time of Mr. Charkaoui's hearing before the Federal Court of Appeal.
At the time that Justice Desjardins rendered her decision, the Supreme
Court was about to hold that the procedure under the IRPA for determining
109. Charkaoui, supra note 106 at para. 14.
110. Ibid. at para. 15.
I11.Ibid.atpara. 12.
112. On the declaratory theory ofjudicial decisions, see Kleinvort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council,
[1998] UKHL 38, [2004] 2 AC 349 at 377. See also Re Spectrum Plus Ltd; National Westminster Bank
plc vSpectrum Plus Ltd. and others, [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680 at 690-693.
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the reasonableness of the security certificate and the detention review
procedures infringed s. 7 of the Charter."3
As a consequence, it would appear that Mr. Charkaoui's right not to
be sent to a country where he would potentially face torture should have
prevailed over security issues. This should have led the Court to suggest
that if the Minister were to make a negative decision on the PRRA against
Mr. Charkaoui, this would not be viewed as a proper application of the
Act, that is to say in compliance with s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA but also in
compliance with Suresh."4 In our opinion, had the Court gone through this
exercise, it would have addressed the very substance of Mr. Charkaoui's
argument.
But the Court missed the opportunity to undertake this analysis. Itis
a missed opportunity because contrary to the first four cases, which dealt
with the best interests of the child, this case dealt with the fundamental
right not to be subjected to torture. Contrary to the first four cases, which
presented section 25 as providing an opportunity for compliance with the
internationally protected right to the best interests of the child, the right not
to be subjected to torture cannot be subsumed into a section 25 analysis.
This leads us to conclude that De Guzman ' analytical framework has yet
to be tested on-and may prove unable to cope with-cases involving the
possibility of torture.
Conclusion
To date, scholars (including ourselves) have been debating which
tools best describe or ought to prescribe Canadian courts' treatment of
international law before and after Baker (presumption, harmonization,
contextual approach, etc.), which instruments (ratified, signed, soft law,
etc.) can be used by them, and what is the weight to be given to each of
these instruments (persuasive value, determinative value, etc.). We have
contributed an answer to some of these questions in the first part of this
article. We have thus suggested that the use of the term harmonization
better describes the courts' treatment of non-implemented international
law, and that it is unrealistic to suggest that courts "presume" compliance
of domestic law with international law. Harmonization depends on the
context of each case; it offers the flexibility required but imposes no
mandatory task on courts; it allows for a consideration of the act as a
whole, in search of similarities between national law and international law,
while preserving the interpreted instrument's own specificity.

113. Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] I S.C.R. 350.
114. Charkaoui,supra note 106 at para. 10, Desjardins J.A.

250

The Dalhousie Law Journal

While these debates are rightfully catching scholarly attention, going
largely unnoticed is the judicial development of sophisticated techniques
that raise new issues about the distinction between the interpretationand
application of legislation when international law is invoked. The second
part of this contribution sought to address these concerns. If harmonization
can be understood as a convenient tool for courts handling the difficult
question of the role of international law in immigration law, one must
acknowledge that harmonization can become a slippery slope, especially
if courts are substituting an interpretative exercise by one focusing on the
application of the Act and its conformity with international law. As our
analysis demonstrated, this is one of De Guzman s legacies. The analytical
framework proposed by the Court of Appeal in that case is fraught with
many difficulties when it comes to applying it to different immigration
processes set by the IRPA and its regulations-and when it comes to
handling issues that do not necessarily involve the best interests of the
child.
The above-mentioned trend that consists of harmonizing legislation
instead of using the presumption mechanism is not unrelated to the other
tendency we have indicated, namely, the courts' focus on the application
of the impugned legislation instead of an interpretative search for its
meaning. Both are linked to the endorsement of a pragmatic approach to
law.
On the one hand, harmonization clearly allows a court to detach itself
from the search of the legislative intention underlying a provision and
attempt to reconcile two bodies of rules in a flexible and contextual manner.
In a similar fashion, the pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation
allows a Court to dissociate itself from the search for the intention of the
legislator and focus on reaching the most appropriate solution for each
case." 5 It is presented as an alternative to the modern approach to statutory
interpretation in Canada. H6
On the other hand, pragmatism is also easily reconcilable with the
Court of Appeal's preference for the consideration of the application of
the impugned legislation rather than a search for its meaning. By focusing
on the practical impact of the legislation, the Court is sending the message

115. It does not mean that the judge is authorized to rule outside of the "framework traced by the
legal system, but that he reaches the solution that best suits the case at bar (...
). The common goal
is to find the just solution, the one that fits, the right one, and that goal transcends the method used,"
see Franqoise Michaut, "Le r6le crdateur dujuge scion l'6cole de la'Sociological Jurisprudence' et le
mouvement rfaliste am~ricain" (1987) 39 R.I.D.C. 343 at 349 [translated by author].
116. R. Sullivan, "Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa
L. Rev. 175.
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that applying a statute in conformity with internatiorial law is perhaps
more important than ascertaining its meaning.
Whether we agree or not with the substantive analysis of the IRPA's
compliance with international law, we may foresee that this approach is
going to be more popular in the future. Of course, what this means is that
the caselaw regarding the relationship between international and domestic
law might grow in an unpredictable fashion-in an area which was hardly
known for its certainties.

